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Abstract—In the practical crowdsourcing systems, there exist
many cooperative tasks, each of which requires a group of users
to perform together, such as finding the shortest multi-hop path
or obtaining the media resources from a set of hosts. In this
paper, we tackle the problem of how to truthfully and fairly
schedule or allocate sufficient users who join mobile crowd-
sourcing applications with their smartphones. Moreover, the
cooperation among users is taken into account. Thus, we present
a novel Cooperative Crowdsourcing (C2) auction mechanism
for crowdsourcing multiple cooperative tasks. C2 contains two
parts: user selection and payment computation. In the first part,
we first prove that users selection with the minimum social
cost is NP hard problem and design a greedy algorithm to
achieve near-optimal solution in polynomial time. The other
part is that the server determines the payments of selected
users to avoid the bidder’s cheating behavior through a pricing
algorithm that if and only if users honestly bid their cost, they
can obtain the maximum utility. Both theoretical analysis and
extensive simulations demonstrate that C2 auction achieves not
only truthfulness, individual rationality and high computational
efficiency, but also low overpayment ratio.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowdsourcing is the classic application of mobile
cloud computing, which is the process of obtaining needed
services or contents by soliciting contributions from a large
group of mobile smartphone users. In the real world, there is
increasing number of cooperative tasks, and this type of task
needs a group of users to perform in terms of the requirements
of applications. Crowd translator [1] recruits smartphone users
from among native speakers of the target language. Since
sufficient users have contributed for the same corpus, a corpus
is created to train a speech recognizer. Doing a survey needs
a large sample space such that its result has the statistical
meanings. All above applications require users’ collective
contribution in order to complete those cooperative tasks.
User participation in the mobile crowdsourcing will incur
resource cost, such as time, battery, bandwidth [2], which
is constrained for personal devices. In general, any rational
person will not provide the sensing or computing service
voluntarily, unless an acceptable reward is offered to com-
pensate the cost. Therefore, many incentive mechanisms have
been proposed to motive users to contribute their resources.
However, they either focus on the multiple independent task
scenario [3]–[8], where each task only needs one user to
perform, or pay attention to the single cooperative task sce-
nario [9]–[11], where the task requires a group of users to
perform cooperatively, which fails to consider interrelation
among various tasks. [3] presents incentive mechanisms for
both platform-centric and user-centric models. However, it
assumes that the users’ cost is a public knowledge. This is
neither a practical in most mobile sensing system nor feasible
for the cooperative crowdsourcing systems. Besides, the user-
centric model only suits for simple tasks auction. The authors
of [4] consider the cooperative task which needs to recruit
enough users to collaborate, but it only concerns one task, and
can not be directly used in multiple tasks case. In a word, it is
vital to design a novel incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing
system with multiple cooperative tasks.
In this paper, we introduce a procurement auction frame-
work, in which the server announces the requirements of
all candidate tasks, then users notice its task-bid information
to the server, finally the server decides the task allocation
policy and the payments for each user winner. Specifically,
we design a novel metric, called cpv, to evaluate the cost
per value obtainment. Based on the metric cpv, we propose
a greedy algorithm to minimize the payment subject to the
target of task value. If the payment for each user winner
equals to its bid, the selfish behavior of each user results
in the chaos of bidding, i.e., each user tends to bid a high
price than his (her) real cost to get more payment. Based
on the design rational of truthful mechanisms, we further
propose a corresponding pricing algorithm to determine the
payment of each user, whereby it can satisfy the property of
truthfulness. Through rigid analysis of C2, we demonstrate
that C2 not only achieves truthfulness, individual rationality
and high computational efficiency, but also in low overpayment
ratio.
With the goal of minimizing the server’s payment, C2 auc-
tion selects users and pays selected users with the constraint
of task value target. Specifically, there are two contributions
in this paper.
1) We first prove that users selection with the minimum
social cost is NP hard problem and design a C2 greedy
algorithm to achieve near-optimal solution in polynomial
time. Furthermore, the server determines the payments
of selected users to avoid the bidder’s cheating behavior
through a pricing algorithm that if and only if users
honestly bid their cost, they can obtain the maximum
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utility.
2) To satisfy the property of truthfulness, we present a
pricing algorithm to determine the payment of each
selected user. Both theoretical analysis and extensive
simulations demonstrate that C2 auction achieves not
only truthfulness, individual rationality and high compu-
tational efficiency, but also low overpayment ratio.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, we present the
detailed design of C2 auction mechanism. Section IV evaluates
the performance of our proposed mechanisms. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper and looks forward to some possible
future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the crowdsourcing system model
with multiple cooperative tasks, where the server recruits
smartphone users in the mobile cloud to perform tasks col-
laboratively.
The system includes a server s and a set of users U , U =
{1, . . . , ui, . . . , uN}. The server has a set of tasks needed to be
completed T = {1, . . . , tj , . . . , tM}. tj requires at least mtj
users to perform, and mtj is named as the Task Threshold for
tj . The set of Task Threshold is denoted as W , i.e., W =
{mt1 , . . . ,mtj , . . . ,mtM }. The sever announces task set T
and the corresponding task thresholds W to users, and the
value of tj (noting as vtj ) is obtained, if and only if it can
recruit mtj users to perform.
Moreover, each user ui has a capacity to perform a subset of
tasks SubTui , SubTui ⊂ T . The set of users’ task capacity is
denoted as Cap, i.e., Cap = {SubTu1, . . . , SubTuN}. To do
its selected tasks, ui has an associated cost cui for providing
the resources, which is private and only known by itself. Thus,
ui claims the bid bui for selling its service no less than its cost,
i.e., bui ≥ cui , and the set of all users’ bids are denoted as B.
The server interacts with the users through a four-step
process, as shown in Fig. 1.
1) The server advertises task set T and the corresponding
task thresholds W to users.
2) Each user announces the task-bid pair (SubTui, bui ) to
the server, where bui is the reserved price ui wants to
sell its service.
3) Based on the task-bid pairs, the server selects a subset
of users Swinner ⊂ U as the winners and computes the
payment pui ≥ bui for each winning user ui, where ui ∈
Swinner . Then s announces the results to the users and
pays the selected users with computed payment.
4) Each selected user ui performs the tasks in its winning
bid, and sends the sensed data back to the server.
Thus, the utility of each winning user ui can be defined as:
Utilityui = pui − cui (1)
The goal of the server is to select users and decide the
payment such that the server’s total payment is minimized
meanwhile the server can obtain the required value Vth, which
can be expressed as:
Objective: Minimize ∑ui∈Swinner pui
s.t.
∑
tj∈Tcomp
vtj ≥ Vth (2)
where Tcomp is the set of completed tasks.
C2 auction mechanism determined by the server is assumed
to be the common knowledge among the users. In the system,
we also consider the existence of selfish users who attempt
to bid the price to make their own utility as high as possible.
Users are also assumed do not collude.
In this paper, we aim to design an incentive mechanism
satisfying the following properties:
• Computational Efficiency: the solution can be computed
in polynomial time.
• Individual Rationality (IR): each participating user will
have non-negative utility.
• Incentive compatibility (IC): also called truthfulness, and
each user always prefers reporting his private information
truthfully to the server rather than any potential lie, i.e.;
the user will get the maximum utility when the bided
price is equal to its real cost.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, we first prove that the user selection problem
is NP hard, thereby failing to exploit the well-known Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to solve it. Furthermore,
we propose an incentive mechanism based on procurement
auction, named as Cooperative Crowdsourcing (C2) auction,
which aims to minimize the total payment of the server, subject
to the given value target.
A. Problem Description
The objective is to design an incentive mechanism that
selects users to minimize the server’s payment under the
condition that the server earns the targeted value. Therefore,
designing such incentive mechanism is an optimization prob-
lem, which can be defined as follows.
Definition 1: User Selection (US) problem: Given a set of
users U , the server selects a subset of users Swinner as workers
such that server’s total payment is minimized, subject to a
given value target.
The US problem can be formalized as the description of Eq.
2.
It is easy to get that the total payment of the server is
minimized with pui = bui . Hence, the server’s total payment
becomes
∑
i∈Swinner
bui (3)
Theorem 1: The US problem is an NP hard problem.
Proof: It is proved that the US problem can be reduced to
Weighted Multiple Set Cover (WMSC) problem in polynomial
time, which has already been proved to be NP-hard in [12].
WMSC INSTANCE: There are n subsets {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}
of the base elements set E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}, and a pos-
itive integer k as well as a positive-integer-valued m-tuple
(p1, p2, . . . , pm). Question: Does there exist a subset C′ ⊆ C
of size k, such that every element ei is covered for at least pi
times.
The mapping instance of the US problem is established as
follows. Let T be the task set mapping to E , where there
is a task tj ∈ T for each ej ∈ E. Corresponding to each
subset Ci ∈ C, user ui ∈ U can do the task set SubTui ,
which contains tasks mapping to the elements in Ci. If every
element ei is covered for pi times, the mapping task tj is done
by multiple users with the size of pj .
Hence, it is obvious that q is a solution of WMSC instance,
if and only if it is a solution of the mapping one of US
problem. Moreover, the reduction from WMSC instance to
US instance ends in polynomial time.
Since the well-known VCG mechanism requires that the
selected set of users is always the one with the lowest cost,
which is impossible to compute in polynomial time because
the US problem is NP-hard. To realize truthfulness of users’
bids while minimizing the payment with a target value for the
server, we propose a non-VCG auction mechanism based on
the procurement auction, the details of which is illustrated in
the following section.
Table I lists the frequently used notations.
TABLE I
NOTATION LIST
Notation Description
Swinner user winners
Scurr current selected users
Sk selected users in the k-th iteration
Tcomp current completed tasks
T kcomp completed tasks in the k-th iteration
SubUtj users able to perform task tj
pui payment to user ui
bui ui’s announced bid
vtj value of task tj
V current obtained task vlaue
Vth given value target
Gtj for task tj , the candidate groups
G for all tasks, the candidate groups
g one candidate group
B. Cooperative Crowdsourcing (C2) Auction
We propose a novel incentive mechanism C2 based on the
procurement auction, which aims to minimize the server’s
total payment, subject to a given value target. C2 auction
mechanism contains two periods: (1) user selection and (2)
payment computation. For user selection period, the candidate
users are selected by groups from the perspective of tasks. For
payment computation period, each selected user is paid by the
highest bid until it is still selected, when all other users’ bids
remain the same.
Algorithm 1 C2 User Selection
Input: Users set (U), tasks set (T ), users’ bids (B), task
thresholds (W), task capacity (L) and task value target (Vth).
Output: Selected users (Swinner) and social cost
(C).
1: Initialization: Tuncom = T , Scuur = ∅, k = 0 and V = 0.
2: for all task tj ∈ Tuncom do
3: Based on mtj and SubUtj , compute the candidate
groups Gtj .
4: end for
5: G =
⋃
Gtj , for all task.
6: while V < Vth do
7: Select the set Sk = argmin cpv(g), where g ∈ G.
8: Scurr = Scurr ∪ Sk, G = G \ Sk
9: V = V +
∑
j∈Tkcomp∩Tuncom
vtj
10: Delete T kcomp from Tuncom
11: k = k + 1
12: end while
13: Swinner = Scurr
14: C =
∑
i∈Swinner
bui
1) User Selection: First, we propose a C2 User Selection
greedy algorithm to solve the US problem, which is illustrated
in Algorithm 1. The basic idea of C2 User Selection algorithm
is to pick out the most cost-efficient user groups by iterations
which have small bids and can realize large task value, until
the value target has been reached. Combing these two criteria
into the single metric,
∑
i∈Sk
bui
∑
j∈Tkcomp
vtj
(4)
is regarded as the ”cost per value”, where T kcomp means the
completed tasks when the user group Sk is selected in the k-th
iteration. By selecting the user group Sk, the tasks T kcomp are
completed at the cost of
∑
ui∈Sk
bui , which is the total bids of
users in Sk. We maintain the set Scurr of the current selected
users and the set Tuncom of the remaining uncompleted tasks
in each iteration. The selected user set Sk in iteration k is
supposed to minimize the marginal cost per value realization,
defined as
cpv(Sk) =
∑
i∈Sk\Scurr
bui
∑
j∈Tkcomp∩Tuncom
vtj
. (5)
For task tj , we extract the user set SubUtj able to perform tj
from all users. Since the size of SubUtj is largely smaller than
the total user set, the search range is compacted a lot. Within
SubUtj , all subset groups with the size of task threshold mtj
are the candidate groups, denoted as Gtj . The union of Gtj
for all tasks is the whole candidate groups G, which is the
search range of user winners. The server selects the user set
Sk with the minimum cpv from G in the k-th iteration.
In Algorithm 1, each while loop (Lines 2 − 3) computes
the candidate groups Gtj which are the subset groups with
the size of task threshold mtj . In each while-loop iteration,
the group with minimum cpv will be selected. In other words,
the selected group has the most cost-efficient bids that make
the ”greatest advance” to achieve the target value with small
payment. k represents the iteration round. The while-loop
shows that the process of user selection is terminated until
the task value is achieved to the given value target.
2) Payment Computation: Combined with C2 User Se-
lection algorithm, we design the pricing algorithm for the
incentive mechanism. We extend and adapt Theorem 2 to make
truth-telling a weakly dominant strategy for each user, such
that only users who bids honestly for its cost can gain the
best payment.
Theorem 2: Based on the theorem in [13] [14], an auction
mechanism is truthful if and only if:
1) The user selection algorithm is monotone: If user ui wins
the auction by bidding bui , it also wins by bidding b′ui ≤
bui .
2) Given the user selection algorithm, there is a unique truth-
ful mechanism associated with this selection algorithm.
The pricing algorithm pays each winner the critical value:
the highest bid the user could claim and still win under
the condition of all other users’ bids being fixed.
Algorithm 2 C2 Payment Determination
Input: User winners (Swinner), candidate groups (G) and
users’ bids (B)
Output: Critical Payments (P)
1: pui = 0 for all users ui ∈ U , Tuncom = T , Scurr = ∅
and V = 0.
2: for all user ui ∈ Swinner do
3: k = 0
4: while V < Vth do
5: Select the set Sk = argmin cpv(g), where g ∈ G.
6: G\{ui} = {G,G ∩ {ui} = ∅}
7: Select the set Sk\{ui} = argmin cpv(g\{ui}), where
g\{ui} ∈ G\{ui}.
8: Scurr = Scurr ∪ Sk\{ui}
9: V = V +
∑
tj∈T
k\{ui}
comp ∩Tuncom
vtj
10: Delete T k\{ui}comp from Tuncom
11: pui = max{cpv(Sk\{ui}) ×
∑
tj∈T kcomp∩Tuncom
vtj −
B(Sk \ Scurr) + bui , pui}
12: k = k + 1
13: end while
14: end for
15: Return P = {pui , ui ∈ Swinner}
In Algorithm 2, the for-loop (Lines 2 − 14) is to compute
the critical bid for each winner ui ∈ Swinner. In each while-
loop, it is aimed to calculate ui’s maximum bid that he can
still be selected in this iteration. Given the current selected
users Scurr and remaining tasks Tuncom, we first select the
set Sk and Sk\{ui} with the minimum cpv from the group
set G and G\{ui}, respectively (Lines 5-7), where G\{ui} is
the candidate groups without ui. The maximum bid in each
iteration is the sum of ui’s bid and the marginal bid difference
between Sk and Sk\{ui}. Let d denote the last iteration in
which the obtained task value V achieves the given target
Vth. In the end, we set the maximum of these d bids among
the while loops to the critical value pui , which can promise
ui to be selected at least in one iteration.
C. Properties of C2 auction mechanism
In this section, we present rigid theoretical analysis to
demonstrate C2 auction mechanism can achieve the desired
properties of individual rationality, truthfulness and computa-
tional efficiency.
1) Individual Rationality : In the C2 payment algorithm,
Line 5 aims to find the subset Sk with ui in the minimum
cpv, while Line 7 tries to find the subset Sk\{i} without ui
in the minimum cpv. We can obtain the inequality cpv(Sk) ≤
cpv(Sk\{i}), otherwise ui will not be selected in the user selec-
tion period. Thus, B(Sk\Scurr)∑
j∈Tk∩Tuncom
vtj
≤ cpv(Sk\{ui}) Therefore,
pui = max{cpv(Sk\{i})×
∑
tj∈T kcomp∩Tuncom
vtj
−B(Sk \ Scurr) + bui , pui} ≥ bui
(6)
It shows that all users’ utility is non-negative.
2) Truthfulness: The monotonicity of the user selection
algorithm can be proved easily since ui bidding a smaller
value could increase the cpv value of the subset with user ui.
Thus, user ui must win in the current or an earlier iteration.
Next, we demonstrate that pui is the critical value for user
ui, i.e. bidding higher pui could prevent ui from winning the
auction otherwise ui must become a user winner. Suppose ui
is selected in the k-th iteration. On the one hand, if bui > pui ,
ui could neither win in the k-th iteration nor in the following
iterations because there exists another subset without ui having
smaller cpv value or V ≥ Vth. On the other hand, if bui < pui ,
ui must be selected in k−th iteration, because cpv value of
the subset with ui is reduced, i.e.,
cpv(Sk) =
bui +B(Sk\(Scurr ∪ {ui}))∑
tj∈T kcomp∩Tuncom
vtj
<
pui +B(Sk\(Scurr ∪ {ui}))∑
tj∈T kcomp∩Tuncom
vtj
(7)
3) Computational Efficiency: First, we compute the time
complexity of user selection algorithm. Since the number of
candidate groups G for all tj ∈ Tuncom is at most C
max(mtj )
p ·
M , computing the cpv value of each subset is in O(C
max(mtj )
p ·
M) time (Lines 2-4), where max(mtj ) is the maximum task
threshold, p = max{|SubUtj |}, SubUtj is the users able to
perform task tj and C
max(mtj )
p is the max(mtj )-combination
of the set p. For line 7, finding the subset Sk with the minimum
cpv is also at most in O(C
max(mtj )
p ·M) time. It is obvious
that max(mtj ) < p≪ N in the real cooperative system. Since
there are M tasks and each while-loop will contribute at least
one task, the number of while-loop is at most M . Hence, the
while-loop (Lines 6− 12) takes O(Cmax(mtj )p ·M2), and the
User Selection algorithm runs in O(C
max(mtj )
p ·M2) time.
Next, we compute the running time of payment determi-
nation algorithm. In each round of finding of minimum cpv
group (Lines 5 and 7), the process similar to Line 7 of
Algorithm 1 is realized. Since by selecting each group at
least one task can be completed and the maximum num-
ber of users in each group is max(mtj ), the maximum
selected users is M · max(mtj ). Therefore, the outside for-
loop (Lines 2−14) takes O(max(mtj )M ·C
max(mtj )
N ·M
2) =
O(max(mtj )C
max(mtj )
p M
3), which dominates the whole auc-
tion. It is obtained that the running time of C2 auction
mechanism is bounded by O(max(mtj )C
max(mtj )
p M
3).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of C2 auction mechanism,
extensive simulations are done to evaluate the impact of
the main parameters. The evaluation includes five types of
performance metrics as follows:
1) Social cost (C): The total cost of selected users. In the
user selection period, it is aimed to choose the users to
make social cost minimized, subject to the value target.
2) Approximation ratio (R): This is the main metric demon-
strating the performance of user selection algorithm. It
illustrates how the proposed greedy algorithm approaches
to the optimal solution (denoted by OPT). R = C
OPT
where C means the social cost.
3) Overpayment ratio [7]: It is computed as γ = P−C
C
,
where P denotes the total payment by the proposed
truthful mechanism. Hence, the overpayment ratio char-
acterizes the cost of the server making each user insisting
on the truthfulness.
4) Utility of all users: The utility of all users is recorded to
show the property of Individual Rationality.
5) Running time: The running time of C2 auction is also
recorded to evaluate its computational efficiency.
A. Simulation Setup
Let δ denote the average fraction of users who can perform
each task, and δN is the average number of users who can
perform each task. In a large system with many tasks, only
a small portion of users can perform each task due to its
resource limitation. For instance, a user in Boston is not able
to perform the tasks that require location-based data from New
York. Hence, δ is expected to be very small, e.g., δ ≪ 1.
The value of each task, the cost of each user and the task
threshold of each task are uniformly distributed over [5, 10],
(5,20) (8,20) (10,20) (5,15) (8,15) (10,15)0
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[1, 5] and [3, 5], respectively. All the simulations in this paper
were run on a PC with 2.9GHZ CPU and 4GB memory. Each
simulation is repeated for 100 times, and the average values
are reported as statistical results.
B. Evaluation of Approximation Ratio
We first evaluate the performance of C2 user selection
algorithm contained in our proposed auction. Since US prob-
lem is NP-hard, it is time consuming to obtain the optimal
solution (noted as OPT) with the general approach, i.e., brute
force search. Hence, the approximate ratio of C2 are only
be evaluated in the settings with small scale. Specifically, the
total number of users N is chose as 15 and 20, while the
number of tasks M is picked as 5, 8 and 10. To reduce the
execution time, the users’ groups are iterated by starting from
the minimum task threshold and terminating when the value
target is reached. Moreover, we set δ = 0.2 to define the
number of users involving the selection, and the target value
Vth is set as the total task value minus 5, i.e., Vth = Vtotal−5.
In Fig. 2, we show the approximate ratios of C2 in various
settings, which are the numbers located over bars. It is clear
that the social costs of C2 user selection method under all
listed settings are very close to that of optimal solutions.
Compared with the cases of N = 15 and N = 20, the social
cost of C2 has declining trend when N = 20. The reason is
that the augment of users resource can make the server have
better choices. With the augment of M , it is shown that the
social cost increases dramatically. That is because the server
needs to recruit more users to complete tasks.
C. Evaluation of Overpayment Ratio
We evaluate the impact of the number of users (N ) on
overpayment ratio. N is varied from 100 to 300 with the
increment of 50, and M from 2 to 10 with the increment
of 2. It is set that δ = 0.1 and Vth = Vtotal − 10. As can
be seen in Fig. 3 (a), the overpayment ratio of C2 auction
keeps below 1 under different M and N , indicating C2
auction with low overpayment cost for the truthful property.
With the increase of N , the overpayment ratio decreases. The
reason is that, since the augment of candidate groups, the cost
bridge between the minimum candidate group and the second
minimum one is suppressed. In addition, with the increase of
M , the overpayment ratio rises accordingly. That is because
the number of selected users increase with the requirement of
more tasks completion.
Fig. 3 (b) shows that the social cost decreases with the rising
number of users and has the opposite trend with the increasing
number of tasks.
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Fig. 3. The impact of N and M on overpayment ratio and social cost
D. Evaluation of Individual rationality
In order to show all users have non-negative utility, we
depict the empirical CDF of the utility for all users under
various settings. From Fig. 4, it is observed that the proportion
of users with negative utility is zero. Only the selected users
have positive utility, thus most of users have zero utility, which
can be shown when utility equals to zero in Fig. 4. Hence, it
is confirmed that all users have non-negative utility, which
illustrates that C2 auction mechanism achieves the property
of individual rationality.
E. Evaluation of Computational Efficiency
Fig. 5 demonstrates the computational efficiency of C2
auction with different settings, which shows the running time
of all cases is under 10 seconds. Based on the research
results from the response time in man-computer conversational
transactions [15], 10 seconds is the limit for users keeping their
attention on the task. Therefore, C2 auction mechanism has
high computational efficiency in the small scale.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted deep and complete incentive
study on the crowdsourcing system with multiple collaborative
tasks. Taking the correlation among tasks and users, we
proposed a truthful incentive mechanism, cooperative crowd-
sourcing (C2) auction to stimulate sufficient users for task
completion, which is composed of a near-optimal approximate
algorithm and a critical payment scheme. Through both the-
oretical analysis and extensive simulations, it is demonstrated
that C2 auction achieves not only truthfulness, individual
rationality and high computational efficiency in small scale,
but also low overpayment ratio. In the future, we shall extend
this work into the online scenario for the real time applications,
as well as the impact of users’ mobility.
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